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I. Introduction
As Development agencies and donors currently promote a community-based approach to the provision of rural water services. This demand-responsive approach calls for a joint effort by community members and government staff in service design, construction, and operation and maintenance (O&M). Community members are typically expected to participate in the design process: in particular, to choose collectively the type and the level of service based on their willingness to pay. In addition, communities may be asked to contribute cash or labor to construction, and take care of operation and maintenance. 1 However, the outcomes of this approach have greatly varied, so development practitioners now wonder: "Under what circumstances is the community-based approach more likely to succeed?"
The objective of this paper is to start unraveling that question by analyzing selected institutional determinants of the impact and performance of communitybased water services. Using quantitative and qualitative data from 1,088 rural households and 50 water committees, the paper investigates how service rules and practices, social capital, and governmental and non-governmental organization (NGO) institutions affect the impact and performance of services supported by three World Bank-financed projects in Sri Lanka and India. 2 The paper focuses on measuring and econometrically analyzing selected aspects of project design and implementation, such as the importance of community participation in service design and decision-making. 3 This paper is also one of the first to measure and econometrically analyze the effect of social capital on the impact of communitybased water services. 4 
II. Impact and Performance of Projects in Sri Lanka and India
A. Community-based Projects in Sri Lanka and India
In the early 1990s, three community-based rural water projects were prepared and implemented in Sri Lanka and in two states of India--Karnataka and Maharashtra. Their objectives were to provide potable water to selected small rural communities that did not have reliable access to safe water within a kilometer or 3 less.
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These projects adopted different 'community-based' strategies. The Sri Lankan households were supposed to contribute 20 percent of construction costs, either in cash or labor. The Indian households, by contrast, did not formally contribute to construction: water services were fully financed through government grant funds. In Sri Lanka and Karnataka, communities were supposed to take responsibility for O&M (including the levying of household tariffs to cover O&M costs). In Maharashtra, by contrast, district and local governments were supposed to take formal responsibility for O&M.
B. Impact and Performance
To analyze the impact and performance of water services provided by these projects, data were collected from 50 communities. Quantitative data were collected through a survey of 1088 households and 50 water committees. 6 Qualitative data were gathered through focus group interviews with community members and interviews with local government officials.
Analysis of these data indicates that the impact and performance of these water services have been mixed. Means and standard deviations of several indicators of service impact and performance are reported in Accordingly, the results in Table 1 are consistent with decreasing returns to health interventions: as a result of the same intervention, households with better initial health experiencing smaller health improvements than households with worse initial health. Likewise, the absolute time savings in Sri Lanka project were lower because the pre-project collection times were significantly lower than in the Indian projects: 76 minutes as opposed to 147 and 129 minutes, respectively.
C. Two case studies
The variation of performance and impacts was confirmed by qualitative beneficiary assessments. Gallella and Passaramulla, two communities served by the Sri Lankan project, provide good examples.
In Gallella, the new water service provided connections to 214 households that, prior to the project, had consumed water from unprotected wells, springs or streams. As service design began, community members, collaborating with government and NGO representatives, agreed that household connections be provided and that the connection cost will depend on household distance from the main pipeline. Households contributed about 43 percent of total construction costs (well above the required 20 percent) in the form of unskilled labor. As the project began, the water committee in Gallella --which had many pre-existing community groups and civic activities --coordinated community participation, monitored household construction contributions, and hired caretakers to handle routine maintenance. The committee established clear procedures for tariff collection to cover O&M expenses: caretakers collect monthly fees and retain written records of payments. Ninety percent of households pay the required fee, which is the highest recovery rate among the surveyed communities, and households get together monthly to clean the water tank. Overall, water services in Gallella have had substantial impacts. Twenty-one percent of households report that the incidence of diarrhea has decreased, and the time-saving for women has been dramatic: an average daily reduction of an hour.
In Passaramulla, only one pipe-borne gravity system was in operation three years after service implementation. Seven other systems were in place but inoperable; many others were incomplete. As service design began, a local NGO was hired to mobilize the community and to help to launch a water committee.
The local government failed to monitor the efforts of this NGO, which were halfhearted: staff members conducted social-mobilization programs poorly and remained detached from the community. 
III. Determinants of Impact and Performance: The Framework
The community-based approach to water delivery calls for collaborative design and construction among community members, government officials, and NGO staff. Their incentives will determine whether, in practice, they actually collaborate, and institutions affect these incentives. In the delivery of communitybased water services, institutions are the formal and informal rules and practices that govern behavior of different groups. 10 By limiting opportunistic behavior, they can hold the groups to their commitments in the design, construction, and O&M of water services, thereby improving service performance and impact. First, water service performance will impact household health and time- Finally, non-institutional determinants are also likely to affect the existence and effectiveness of service rules (link 5). 14 These include household assets, household size, level of human capital, and environmental conditions. For example, the availability of alternative water source will affect a community's willingness to craft effective system rules and practices.
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IV. Determinants of Performance and Impact: Empirical Evidence
Does the framework presented in the previous section hold in practice?
This section provides empirical evidence for the linkages in the framework, using data from the household and water committee surveys.
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A. Proximate determinants of impact
The first link in the framework ties service performance to impact. To estimate the proximate determinants of health impacts, begin with an econometric model based on the following relationship:
where H ij * is a latent random variable for household i in community j which is some measure of the changed health of the household since the implementation of a community-based water service. Assume that H ij * is a linear function of a set of non-stochastic independent variables and an error term (ε ij ). These covariates include (as discussed in the previous sections): D j , design performance of the water service in community j; C j, construction performance of the water service in community j; and X ij , a vector of household-specific characteristics.
The dichotomous variable 'improved health,' is used as the dependent variable (with Probit estimation) to test the relationship presented in equation (1), because the available data do not include continuous measures of the change of household health. 17 The community-level independent variables used to test these relationships (summarized in Appendix Table 1 ) are 'community design satisfaction', the share of households in each community that were satisfied with project design; and 'good quality construction', a dummy variable for well-built water systems. The household-level independent variables are 'hygiene training', a dummy variable for households that have attended a hygiene class; 'household size', the number of residents in the household; and 'household assets', a composite index of household durable goods.
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The results of testing the linkage between performance and health impacts (equation 1), are listed in Table 2 and summarized as follows:
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• Improving community satisfaction with service design enhances the service's health impact. 'Community design satisfaction' is a significant and positive determinant of improved health in all three projects. Based on the standard deviations reported in Appendix Table 1 and the change in probabilities reported in Table 2 , a one-standard deviation increase in 'community design satisfaction' is associated with an increase in the probability of improved health of 0.09 in Sri Lanka, 0.13 in Karnataka, and 0.11 in Maharashtra..
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• Ensuring that water services are well constructed enhances the service's health impact. 'Good quality construction' is a significant and positive determinant of improved health in Sri Lanka and Maharashtra (and positive in Karnataka). 21 A change from bad quality (the presence of serious construction defects) to good quality (the absence of serious construction defects) construction is associated with an increase in the probability of improved health of 0.13 in Sri Lanka and 0.18 in Maharashtra.
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• Providing hygiene training (or ensuring that hygiene training is provided by other sources) enhances the service's health impact. Enrollment in a hygiene class is associated with an increase in the probability of improved health of 0.13 in Sri Lanka and 0.20 in Maharashtra.
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• Non-institutional household variables (household size and assets) are not significant determinants of improved health in any of the three projects. This is true also of indicators (not reported here) such as household demographics and wealth 24 and the type of previous drinking water source used by the household (for example, hand-dug well or spring).
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A similar econometric framework is adopted to estimate the proximate determinants of time-saving impacts. In this case, the econometric model is based on the following relationship:
where T ij is a continuous measure of the time-saving of household i in community j. 26 The estimation procedure must account for the fact that time savings are likely to be greater in households in which the pre-project collection times are significantly higher, as discussed before. Accordingly, using the logarithm of time-saving as the measure of T ij allows one to estimate the percentage change of time-saving per household.
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The results of testing the linkage between performance and time savings (equation 2) are listed in Table 3 and summarized as follows:
• Improving community satisfaction with service design reduces water Overall, the results in this section suggest that well-designed and wellconstructed water services are likely to improve household health, and that welldesigned water services are likely to lower collection times. They also underline the importance of providing hygiene classes in conjunction with a water project for improving household health. While these conclusions are certainly not ground breaking, these results allow one to establish the statistical significance and relative magnitudes of the importance of well-designed and well-constructed water services across three different projects. 29 More importantly, these results allow one to test econometrically the less explored linkages of this framework:
how institutions underlie the performance indicators.
B. Institutional determinants of performance
Does community participation and decision-making lead to higher satisfaction with service design, as suggested by the framework? To answer this question, three household-level dummy variables were created from survey questions about the service design process. First, 'local initiation' indicates that community members, as opposed to government officials or other outsiders, had the original idea to build the water system. Second, 'design participation'
indicates that the household participated in service design. Third, 'local decisionmaking' reflects that community members, as opposed to government officials or other outsiders, made the final decision about what type of system to build.
30 Table 4 reports results from probit estimates of the household-level 14 determinants of 'satisfaction with service design', with community fixed effects.
The results can be summarized as follows 31 :
• Households are no more satisfied with service design when the original idea to build a system comes from community leaders rather than from outsiders.
• User participation in design leads to greater satisfaction with service design.
A discrete change from not participating to participating leads to an increase in the probability of being satisfied with service design of 0.196, 0.253, and 0.419 in Sri Lanka, Karnataka, and Maharashtra, respectively.
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• Letting locals make the decision about the system type leads to greater satisfaction with service design. A discrete change from stating that local decision-making did not prevail to stating that it did leads to an increase in the respective probabilities of 0.191, 0.322, and 0.540.
These results conform to the analytical framework. Households are more likely to be satisfied with service design when they have participated in the design process and when the community makes the final decision about service type. This is true within each project and within each community (given the use of community fixed effects), despite different approaches to service design among the projects. In addition, these results indicate that the initiation of well-designed services can begin from outside or inside of the community, as long as local participation in design and decision-making is ensured.
What are the institutional determinants of good construction? Is construction better when household contributions are monitored and sanctions against misconduct are imposed, as suggested by the framework? Since 'good quality construction' is a community-level variable, the sample size for addressing these questions econometrically must be 50, the number of communities in the sample. Table 5 lists the within-project associations between 'good quality construction' and two indicators of service rules and practices. 'Construction monitoring' is the community share of households that said that the required construction contributions (cash or labor) were monitored by other community members. 'Construction sanctions' is the community share of households that said that households that did not contribute their share were charged a financial penalty.
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The analysis yields the following results about the determinants of 'good quality construction':
• Existence of monitoring mechanisms leads to better quality construction. A one-standard deviation increase in 'construction monitoring' increases the probability of 'good quality construction' by 0.38.
• Existence of construction sanctions does not measurably improve construction quality. 34 Overall, the results in this sub-section show that community participation and decision-making in service design lead to well-designed services, and monitoring of household contributions to construction lead to better-constructed services.
C. Social capital and service rules
Finally, the framework suggests that existence of service rules depends on social capital. This section tests if social capital is a significant determinant of 'design participation' and 'construction monitoring'.
An econometric model based on the following relationship is used to assess the influence of social capital on service rules:
where P ij * is a latent random variable for of household i in community j which is some measure of the intensity 35 of design participation; S ij is a measure of household-level social capital; X ij and X j are vectors of household and community characteristics that could affect the participation decision, and µ ij is an • The results summarized in Table 6 reveal that social capital and design participation are associated. Higher household-level social capital is positively associated with participation in the service design. Specifications • The statistically significant relationship between social capital and design participation survives the inclusion of other potential covariates. Specifications (2), (4) and (6) reveal that the inclusion of 'household assets' and 'family size', with community fixed effects, does not change the basic relationship between the 'social capital index' and 'design participation'.
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The robustness of these results is confirmed in two ways. First, in all six specifications, replacing the 'social capital index' with either of its the sub-indices or 'help from outsiders' yields the same statistically significant relationship between a measure of social capital and design participation. 42 Second, in the two specifications for Sri Lanka, the only project that required household participation in construction, replacing the 'design participation' with the equivalent 'construction participation' yields a statistically significant relationship (not reported here). A one-standard deviation increase in the social capital index is associated with a 0.09 increase in the probability of construction participation. Two of the three alternative social capital indicators ('number of groups' and 'help from outsiders') also yield statistically significant relationships.
Also, community-level social capital is a positive and significant determinant of construction monitoring. Table 8 
D. Magnitudes of the effect of institutions on impact
The previous results suggest a chain of causality from institutions -(social capital and service rules) to project performance and impact. This section calculates the implied magnitudes of the effect of institutions on service impact, improvement of household health and reduction of water collection time.
The first part of Table 8 The final two rows of Table 8 present similar calculations of these magnitudes for time-saving, based on similar underlying equations. The calculations from the structural equations, from 0.012 to 0.024, are also within a plausible range, despite the large differences among the projects. These magnitudes translate to time-saving of 9, 35, and 25 minutes, respectively, from more community-level design participation.
Since both 'design participation' and 'construction monitoring' are endogenous in this framework (that is, they are determined by social capital and other factors), another way to calculate the effect of institutions on service impact is with 'reduced form' 43 estimations, where the community-level social capital index replaces both 'community design satisfaction' and 'good quality construction' in the specification tested in Table 2 Table 9 presents the estimates of single-and two-stage reduced form models. In single-stage estimation, probit models show that only in the case of Maharashtra is the village-level social capital index positive and significant (coefficients of 0.0269 and 0.0244 respectively).
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In the IV estimation, two instruments for the social capital index are used, based on additional survey questions about community activities. 'Household community activity' is the community-level average of households that participated in a community-level activity; and 'multiple community activities' is the community-level average of households that reported multiple community activities. The a priori case for using these as instruments for the social capital index is that more community activities are positively associated with the quality and quantity of associational activity, but do not have an independent effect, outside of this framework, on improved health.
46 Table 9 shows that the IV results are positive and significant in the case of Sri Lanka and Maharashtra, with coefficients of 0.0286 and 0.0417, respectively.
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Using these IV results, a one-standard deviation increase of community-level social capital is associated with an increase 0.17 and 0.13 in the probability of improved health. 48 These magnitudes are slightly larger than the sum of the magnitudes of design participation and construction from the structural equations. 49 Accordingly, the evidence from the two-stage reduced form equations, in two of the three projects, suggests that more social capital --the critical determinant of design participation and construction monitoring --leads to improved household health for about 26 to 34 households in a community of 200 households.
The final two rows of Table 9 
V. Conclusion
Using data from Sri Lanka and India, this paper has shown that welldesigned and well-constructed water services lead to improved household health and reduced water collection times. The results suggest that one can promote well-designed services-(that is, increase user satisfaction with the service design) by involving community members in the design process and by letting community members, not outsiders, make the final decision about the service type. Ensuring that communities have effective mechanisms to monitor household contributions to construction is in turn an effective way to promote well-constructed services.
However, household participation in service design and ability to craft and enforce monitoring mechanisms are not automatic. The empirical results presented here suggest that in communities with high levels of social capital--in particular, with active community groups and associations--design participation is more likely to be high and monitoring mechanisms are more likely to be in place.
In those communities, households are accustomed to working together and social ties deter free riding. This suggests a way to place an economic value on community-level social capital in the context of water projects: as the net present value of the marginal increase in health associated with active civic associations.
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What do these results, in particular the results about social capital, imply for designers of community-based water projects? They do not necessarily suggest that projects should avoid investing in community-based water systems in communities with low levels of social capital. Indeed, while many poor communities with the most urgent need for improved water systems are likely to have low levels of social capital 51 , people in many of these communities are likely to reliably report a willingness to pay and maintain a water system. Instead, these results suggest that designers of community-based water projects need to pay attention to the prevailing levels of social capital, as one of the factors that will influence the performance of the project, in communities to be served by the project. When targeting these communities, the allocation of investment resources for water services programs may need to be adjusted to take into account the lack of social capital. Possible adjustments include increased investments in social mobilization efforts (for example, through the strengthening of local organizations) and in more direct supervision by project personnel working in these communities to oversee system performance. Notes: Dependent variable is household satisfaction with the design of the water system. Multivariate probit estimation, with Huber-adjusted standard errors (in parentheses).
Estimates are for discrete changes of independent dummy variables. Significance levels are: *** (.99%); ** (.95%); * (.90%) See text for descriptions of variables. Notes: Dependent variable is household participation in the design of water system. Probit estimation, with Huber-adjusted standard errors (in parentheses).
Estimates are marginal changes in probability of independent variable. Significance levels are: *** (.99%); ** (.95%); * (.90%) See text for descriptions of variables. Results from other independent variables not reported.
Estimates are marginal changes in probability of independent variable. Significance levels are: *** (.99%); ** (.95%); * (.90%) See text for descriptions of variables. Alternative measures of the change of impacts based on a one-standard deviation change of institutional determinants. See text for descriptions of the underlying models and the calculation of the magnitudes. 12 In a global study on the performance of community-based water systems in Benin, Bolivia, Honduras, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Uganda, Sara and Katz found that unless the service rules gave all community members a chance to express their preferences about service, community representatives often failed to consider the demand of certain segments of the population, such as women or the poor. In addition, unless there were adequate monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms, community representatives often did not act in good faith. indicate that households are likely to act collectively in irrigation projects where they face sufficient water scarcity and are assured that organization could make a substantial difference in their yields. According to Uphoff, households in the middle range of the irrigation system, where water is neither abundant (as in the head-end of the system) nor absolutely scarce (as in the tail-end of the system) and thus returns to cooperation high, are most likely to act collectively. While there were no data available to test the impact of community-level water scarcity on household-level participation in this paper, we do allow for this possibility in the estimation procedures below by testing for community-level fixed effects. 16 Since no quantitative data on governmental and NGO institutions were collected, this paper does not provide empirical evidence of their significance. Qualitative evidence on the importance of governmental and NGO institutions for service performance is found in the two case studies in Section II. 17 Using the notation in equation (1), let 'improved health' be relabeled H ij , so that H ij = 1 if H ij * > 0 and H ij = 0 if H ij * ≤ 0. Probit estimation is used here: in no case does using other techniques for analyzing dichotomous dependent variables, including linear probability or logit analysis, alter the fundamental results reported below. 18 As in Narayan and Pritchett, we build a composite index of household wealth from a weighted sum of household durable goods such as radios, refrigerators, and sewing machines. It is also possible to use self-reported consumption expenditures as a proxy for long-run household 19 The econometric procedures in this section use the following guidelines, except where noted in the text. First, because of the differences in project design discussed in Section II (and the likelihood of region-specific omitted variables), all econometric results are reported by project. Second, all results use household-level dependent variables. Third, since heteroskedasticity (nonconstant variance of the error term) is likely in the underlying econometric equations, all results are reported with Huber-adjusted standard errors. We thank Chris Grootaert for his suggestions in this regard. 20 These results on 'community design satisfaction' could be biased upward due to reverse causality if improved household health leads the household to report that they are satisfied with project design. To test for this possibility, 'community design satisfaction' was replaced with "neighbors' design satisfaction", the share of all other community members that were satisfied with the project design. In similar specifications, the respective coefficients for this variable are 0.67, 0.77, and 0.37, all at significance levels greater than 0.99%. 21 In Karnataka, the magnitude of the coefficient is similar to that of the other projects, but the significance level is much lower. Evaluation of the data gathering in Karnataka suggests that there is large measurement error, another justification for separating the results by project.
22 Similar results can generally be shown using a set of alternative measures of construction quality based on more detailed questions (for example, 'leakage in networks' and 'frequent system failures'). 23 The latter result may be subject to reporting bias. It is possible that households who have taken a class will report 'improved health', even when an objective analysis would show no measurable improvements. 24 For example, number of children in the household and self-reported household income and expenditures. 25 One possible objection to these results is that the self-reported 'improved health' variable is not an accurate indicator of the project impact. Within each project, self-reported 'improved health' is positively correlated (at the 10 percent significance level or better) with most of the other impact and performance indicators in Table 1 , including the performance indicators from the technical assessments. The exceptions are 'change of collection time' in Sri Lanka, 'no construction defects' in Karnataka, and 'non-colored water' in Sri Lanka and Karnataka. 26 Since household-level time-saving depend primarily on community-wide decisions made during service design about the location of the water services, it is not necessary to include C j , the measure of construction performance in community j, in this model. Inclusion of 'construction monitoring' in the estimations reported below (not reported here) does not significantly change the overall results on 'design participation' and the other independent variables.
27 For example, β 1 ( = ∂ ln(time savings)/∂ D j ,) is the percentage change in time savings associated with a marginal change in design performance. (These relationships are not expressed as elasticities to facilitate the comparison between the magnitudes of health impact results.) Another way to account for the difference in initial conditions (which gives similar results as those reported below) is to use time-saving (in minutes) as the dependent variable and to include the preproject collection time as an independent variable. 28 It is hard to know what to make of the result on 'hygiene class' in Maharashtra (where enrollment in a hygiene class is associated with a decrease of collection time of 77 percent). 29 While many case studies support these overall findings, there is a surprising lack of empirical studies that test the basic determinants of performance of community-based water services. The approach used here does build on the survey instruments and some of the findings of Narayan and Sara and Katz. 30 The summary statistics for these variables underline the different approaches to service design across each project, as discussed in Section II. In particular, the means for 'design participation' (0.84, 0.11, 0.21, respectively) and 'local decision-making' (0.72, 0.56, 0.30, respectively) confirm that the Sri Lanka project was the most participatory in terms of soliciting local opinions and giving community members a voice in the design process. 31 Note that the sample sizes in these specifications are smaller than in Table 2 because they use community fixed effects and in two communities in Sri Lanka, one community in Karnataka and two communities in Maharashtra, there is no household that that reported satisfaction with project design. 32 In this context, it would have been helpful to know whether households fully understood the financial obligations that they incurred by the choice of one system over another. However, data to analyze this were not available. 33 The means and (standard deviations) for 'construction monitoring' and 'construction sanctions' are 0.43 (0.37) and 0.20 (0,29), respectively. Even though not required by project design, some households in India--particularly in Karnataka--reported contributing cash or labor to service construction and noted the existence of monitoring and sanctioning of these contributions. 34 This may reflect the fact that only a small share of households in each community reported that sanctions were imposed on non-contributors. Most households stated that even though there may have been rules about sanctions, nothing in practice happened to noncontributors. The rules about sanctions were never enforced. Another possibility is that informal social sanctions, in the presence of effective monitoring, are a constraint against household free riding. 35 Intensity of design participation would be measured, for example, by hours per household. As pointed out by a peer reviewer, this is to be distinguished from the quality of participation. 36 As discussed below, a household that reports no group affiliation receives a value of 0 for this sub-index. 37 Notwithstanding the obvious difficulties in trying to capture in a common metric the very different phenomena of group heterogeneity, participation, and functioning, this type of index (as in Narayan and Pritchett) attempts to identify, from microeconomic data, characteristics of social capital that have been shown to be important elsewhere, including: Milton Esman, and Norman Uphoff, Local Organizations: Intermediaries in Rural Development, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); See the discussions in Narayan and Pritchett and Grootaert on the pros and cons of using an index of social capital. In particular, Grootaert makes the point that using this kind of multiplicative index means that the group characteristics act like a productivity shifter for the number of groups 38 The use of an additive sub-index based solely on the survey questions assigns, by default, a relative weight to the value of each question. As in Narayan and Pritchett, we experimented with different weights for the questions that comprise 'group characteristics', including weights generated from factor analysis. Since the use of different weights did not dramatically change the overall results, we retain these 'default' weights.
39 These village-level means are much lower in Karnataka and Maharashtra since both group characteristics and the social capital index take on the value of 0 when a household has no group membership. As noted in Appendix Table 1 , the means of group characteristics among households that belonged to groups are 7.56, 7.23 and 6.47, respectively; the means of the social capital index among households that belonged to groups are 25.65, 10.47 and 11.41, respectively. These differences show that groups in Sri Lanka and Karnataka are slightly more heterogeneous, participatory, and effective than those in Maharashtra; and that the index of social capital is more than twice as large among households that belonged to groups in Sri Lanka compared to India 40 Using community-level fixed effects means that these specifications are capturing the household-level effect of social capital on design participation, controlling for the possible effect of a vector of community-level variables X j that could affect the participation decision. Note that the sample sizes in specifications 4 and 6 are smaller because in one community in Karnataka and five
